Introduction
The effects of issuing public debt, both domestic and external have been the subject of substantial scrutiny and analysis. While Ricardian Equivalence indicates that the level of public debt should be a priori irrelevant for economic outcomes as consumers anticipate its effect on future taxes and adjust consumption accordingly (Barro, 1974) , there are several arguments rooted in both the neoclassical and the Keynesian traditions that suggest that the level of public debt does matter. 1 In those cases, debt issuance would involve intertemporal transfers that may have sizable implications on aggregate demand and economic activity. A normative implication of this view is that debt should increase during recessions and shrink during expansions.
After the debt crisis of the 1980s economists also started focusing their attention on the implications of external debt. Accessing international financial markets has been considered at * Kevin Cowan is with the Central Bank of Chile, Eduardo Levy Yeyati is with Universidad Torcuato di Tella and the Research Department of the Inter-American Development Bank IDB, Ugo Panizza is with the Research Department of the Inter-American Development Bank and Federico Sturzenegger is with Universidad Torcuato di Tella and the Kennedy School at Harvard University. This work was financed by the Network of Central Banks and Finance Ministries of the Regional Policy Dialogue and was made possible by the help of the members of Network of Central Banks and Finance Ministries. The views expressed in this paper are the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the institutions with which they are affiliated. 1 One possible reason is the presence of distortionary taxes, other reasons are due to the fact that agents may not fully anticipate the effects of future taxes or may use a higher rate to discount the future welfare of their offsprings. For a survey of possible exceptions to Ricardian Equivalence see Mankiw (2000) .
times both as a bliss -as it opens up the availability of capital resources to capital scarce countries-and as a curse -to the extent that it exposes the borrowing country to an unstable financing environment (in particular, roll-over risk). 2 More recently, economists also started to focus on the currency composition of debt stocks. There is a growing consensus that the presence of a currency mismatch exposes the country to balance sheet effects in the event of real exchange rate adjustment. In addition, the anticipation of these effects may by itself trigger self-fulfilling currency or liquidity runs. This view has found empirical support in many studies that highlight the role played by currency mismatches in the run up to financial crises. 3 Lately a second composition dimension, namely, the place of issuance, has started to gain importance in the policy discussion, particularly in light of the high correlation between currency and jurisdiction:
unlike external debt, domestic debt is often denominated in the local currency, and increasingly so, which points at market imperfections as potential drivers of the high dollarization ratios exhibited by external debt. 4 Place of issuance, has also been found to be of relevance regarding the fate of public debt in recent debt restructurings.
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Although economists have made important advances in developing theoretical models aimed at evaluating the impact of debt in both normal and crisis times, and in developing sophisticated techniques aimed at measuring debt sustainability, the empirical work has been hindered by the lack of a rich and comparable cross-country dataset on the level and composition of public debt. The most widely used sources of cross-country data on public debt are the
International Financial Statistics (IFS) published by the International Monetary Fund and the
World Development Indicators (WDI) and Global Development Finance (GDF) published by the World Bank. Data on smaller set of countries are also available from the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC) and from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). All these present, however, several important drawbacks.
2 Volatility of capital flows is not sufficient to argue that international capital market access is harmful, but combined with moral hazard issues, self-fulfilling crises or asymmetric information it is possible to rationalize that integration to capital markets may reduce welfare. 3 The implications of currency mismatches have been flagged by Krugman (1999) , Aghion, Banerjee and Bacchetta (2000) , Caballero and Krishnamurty (2002) , and Cespedes, Chang and Velasco (2004) , among many others. Supporting empirical evidence is provided by Eichengreen et al (2003) , Berganza and García Herrero (2003) , Goldstein and Turner (2003) , Calvo et al. (2003) , and Levy Yeyati (2006) . 4 The argument that some degree of home bias combined with differential currency preferences between residents and non-residents may render the currency of denomination of debt "habitat-dependent" (more specifically, determined by the residence of the lender) is developed in Levy Yeyati (2004) . This domesticexternal market distinction is in line with the evidence that past debt de-dollarization experiences have been driven by a deepening of the domestic markets (Bordo et al., 2002) , and that the dollarization ratio of government bonds is negatively correlated with the size of domestic financial markets (Claessens et al., 2003) . At any rate, the importance of counting with accurate measures of the level and composition of public debt cannot be overemphasized. The objective of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, to fulfill this information gap, we introduce the first comprehensive database on sovereign debt (henceforth, CLYPS), systematically compiled to ensure comparability, comprising all countries in the Americas. 7 On the other hand, we discuss the main stylized facts regarding sovereign debt for Latin America in the last two decades or so in light of this new information set. To the best of our knowledge the only other paper that provides information on the composition of public debt in a sample of emerging market countries is Jeanne and Guscina (2006) . In particular, they focus on 19 emerging economies, of which 5 (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela) in Latin America and hence are also included in our dataset.
Jeanne and Guscina (2006) also cover 7 Asian countries and 6 countries located in Eastern
Europe and the Middle East.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the sources used to compile the data and briefly discusses some methodological issues. Section 3 highlights major trends in level 5 The role of jurisdiction in sovereign debt litigation is reviewed in Zettelmeyer (2005a, 2006) . 6 In a recent effort, Jaimovich and Panizza (2006) partially address this problem by reporting total sovereign debt figures for a large sample of countries and years, albeit based on heterogenous sources and definitions. No disaggregation is provided. 7 Three non-American economies are also included for comparison: New Zealand, Pakistan and South Africa.
and composition of public debt in the Americas. In Section 4, the paper discusses the issue of debt dollarization in detail. Finally, section 5 concludes.
Methodological Issues and Sources
A number of methodological choices were made in the construction of our database. The first one pertains to the levels of government to be considered. Specifically, whether subnational entities will be included in a consolidated total, whether and how central bank assets and liabilities should be handled, and whether the liabilities of State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) should be added in the computation.
Regarding the first aspect, we prefer to assume, conservatively, that subnational debt is not implicitly guaranteed by the sovereign, thus should be excluded from the computation. It has to be noted, however, that in many instances (including recent episodes en the region) the central government assumed part or all of the subnational debt. Furthermore, several small countries in our sample do not have subnational entities and, as a result, their reported debt is comparable to that of the consolidated public sector in the standard case of a partially decentralized government.
It follows, that comparing the federal government debt of a country without subnational levels of government with one with subnational governments may underestimate the debt burden of the latter relative to the former. In order to address this concern, data on subnational debt is also reported in the database.
By contrast, we add central bank non-monetary liabilities to the final debt figure, particularly since a significant fraction of multilateral and external lending to the central government in developing economies is typically assumed directly by the Central Bank despite representing an outstanding obligation of the national authorities. Perhaps more controversially, we exclude -as virtually all countries do in their official debt statistics-short-term central bank obligations issued for the purpose of monetary regulation (although the line between financing and financing instruments is not always clear). Since for most practical purposes monetary liabilities are unlikely to be redeemed, we exclude them from the computation of public debt.
Finally, we exclude from the analysis the liabilities of SOE (including public banks). We do this partly because SOE debt is not always guaranteed by the government, and partly because these liabilities are used (most of the time) to finance real assets of the SOE that can be seized by creditors in the event of default. Counting the liabilities without an equivalent assessment of the asset base (or, more generally, the net worth of the companies) would overstate the contingent liabilities of the public sector. which were technically loans (so that banks were able to book them at nominal value instead of marking them to market) but, as a new incarnation of bonded debt, were designed to be traded over-the-counter -which they did to a considerable degree. For this reason, we report them under marketable debt.
Once the value for each debt type are computed, we look into its currency composition.
In general, we classify debt into domestic and foreign currency denominated (we consider local currency debt indexed to the exchange rate as equivalent to the latter), although in some cases we report the share of CPI-indexed debt. We additionally classify debt according to its remaining maturity, where long-term denotes obligations with at least one year to maturity.
Finally, we report data on interest rates, whenever a meaningful measure can be constructed. Interest rates are available for official lending, but rarely for other debt instruments.
Average spreads on external dollar denominated debt as computed in the Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) are available only for the few countries that have issued marketable debt with sufficient liquidity, which comprises a limited number of country and years. We complete this information and compute a typical interest profile for marketable debt by choosing a representative instrument, typically the one with the largest trading volume in each year 9 Since the recent Argentina restructuring the same bonds were issued with both New York and Buenos Aires legislation, with the New York bonds trading at tighter spreads. See Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005b) for a comprehensive review of the differences in treatment for domestic and external debt in recent debt restructurings.
(according to data sourced from Bloomberg). All this implies that the interest rate series reported here have to be taken with caution. First, while the rate for official debt is an average rate (the implicit rate that the government is effectively paying), the interest rate on marketable debt represents an estimate of the marginal rate in the debt market. Furthermore, these rates correspond to debt stocks (or instruments) with duration that changes over time -a caveat that also affects the standard EMBI index. To highlight these considerations, we report not only the interest rate (both in domestic and foreign currency) but also the corresponding duration in each case.
In building the data, we follow a systematic pecking order to select from the several sources at hand. We started with the information provided by the government, either in response to a survey specifically designed for this project, or in the form of statistical bulletins prepared by the finance ministry or the central bank. As a secondary source, as well as for the main consistency check regarding official lending, we resorted to data from multilateral organizations (World Bank, IMF and BIS). In addition, a number of publications by international investment banks, specialized newspapers, and online information systems were tapped to fill in the gaps.
Whenever different sources give conflicting numbers, we used local official sources as our preferred option, and total debt levels as the main variable to test overall consistency.
Specifically, we looked at local official sources for (total) external and domestic debt stocks, and worked down from there to obtain the building blocks that add up to the aggregate stocks. As information on official debt presented discrepancies only very rarely, the main difficulty remained to obtain reliable data on marketable debt and bank loans. Here, we reconciled data from different sources and, when needed, the values were derived as residuals between two available lines.
It is easy to illustrate the relevance of these many methodological choices in the final numbers. Consider Figure 1 , which plots different measures of the debt-to-GDP ratio for Mexico.
There are at least three sources (IFS, ECLAC, and the Mexican government's "traditional" definition of debt) that provide a number for the debt ratio in 2004 of roughly 25 percent. By contrast, our data indicates a debt-to-GDP ratio of around 40 percent, and the Mexican "augmented" definition indicates a debt ratio of approximately 47 percent -the difference between these last two numbers is due to the fact that we do not include as sovereign obligations the debt issued by Mexican development banks and PIDIRIEGAS (infrastructure projects with deferred expense booking). In turn, the large differences with the IFS, ECLAC and "traditional" measure arise mostly from the way in which one treats the debt issued in 1995 to rescue the banking system after the 1994 crisis (note that all definitions are gross and thus do not differ in the netting procedure). represented in ECLAC and not in CLYPS.
Concerning the already noted scarcity of information on debt composition, CLYPS improves upon existing publicly available datasets by including the composition of public debt by currency, term, and type of lender. As indicated in column 3, there are 16 Latin American and
Caribbean countries for which the database reports information on currency composition (these are the countries for which currency composition is available for both domestic and external debt;
there are another 7 countries for which the data on currency composition is limited to external debt) and 9 countries for which it reports data on the term structure. In addition, the data disaggregates total public debt into (bilateral or multilateral) official debt, bank debt, and market instrument debt. 
Debt Level and Composition: Major Trends
This section describes the evolution of the level and composition of debt in the Americas since the early 90s. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the Debt to GDP ratio in 22 Latin American and Caribbean (henceforth LAC) countries for which we have data over a long sample period (the figure does not include data for the Dominican Republic, which starts in 2002). If we look at simple averages (the dark bars), we find that debt ratios decreased rapidly in the early 1990s, bottomed out in 1997 and 1998, and started growing again to peak in 2003, at which point a new downward trend is insinuated. However, if we instead focus on median values (the narrow light bars), the dramatic ups and downs mostly disappear, reflecting the fact that the decline of the 10 IFS only covers 9 countries in the LAC region and does not report data for several large countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador) . 11 For all these categories, there are finer subdivisions. For instance, official debt is divided into bilateral and multilateral debt, and multilateral debt is divided into debt with the IMF, the World Bank, the IDB, and early 1990s and the rise in the late 90s was largely driven by events in a few highly indebted countries. This picture is confirmed by the weighted average debt ratio which shows a milder reduction in debt levels in the early 90s than the simple average (reflecting the fact that that the largest reductions were concentrated in a few small countries) and a substantial increase in the second half of the 90s, reflecting the incidence of a few large and highly indebted countries.
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It is interesting to compare the evolution of public debt in Latin America with that of the two industrial countries in the Western Hemisphere: Canada and the U.S.. percentage points above that of Canada.
The 22-country sample used to compute the averages reported in Figure 2 can be naturally divided into two groups of countries with distinct debt characteristics: (i) emerging economies with access to the international capital markets and a larger share of private (and, recently, bonded) debt; and (ii) countries with limited or no access to international markets that depend mostly official lending and, to a lesser extent, on captive domestic demand. With this in mind, we leave out the Bahamas (a high-income offshore center), and classify as emerging markets the eleven LAC countries included in J.P. Morgan's Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) portfolio, and as non-emerging markets the remaining nine countries.
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Emerging market countries
Emerging market countries are the largest in the region, so it is not surprising that the behavior of the weighted average of debt ratios for this subgroup of countries (both including and excluding Argentina) is basically identical to the weighted average of the whole sample of countries (as can be seen from a comparison of Figures 2 and 4) . By contrast, the simple average of debt over GDP and its median value are lower than those of the whole sample. Again, however, we find a with other multilateral institutions. On the other hand, domestic bank and bonded debt can be separated from international bank and bonded debt. 12 The weighted average corresponds to the ratio of aggregate debt over the aggregate. Note also that these numbers are somewhat influenced by the explosive debt ratios in To better understand what is driving the debt to GDP ratios, Figure 5 splits the percentage changes in the Debt to GDP ratio into percentage changes in real GDP, the real exchange rate and the dollar value of debt. In the early 90s real growth and appreciating currencies helped bring debt to GDP ratios down in the EM subgroup. This lasted up to the time of the Asian crisis, after which growth slowed and currencies depreciated throughout the subgroup. Indeed, it is only in 2004 that (once again) real growth and appreciations contribute to bringing down the debt to GDP ratio once again. Changes in the amount of debt, in turn, explain all of the increase in debt ratios between 1995 and 1998 (largely due to rising stocks of debt in Mexico and Brazil). After 2000 the debt over GDP is strongly influenced by events in Argentina (falling output and a large depreciation of the currency).
A cursory look at Table 3 and Figure 6 , show that the subgroup averages discussed above hide wide differences across countries in both the level and evolution of debt. As a result of a stable official external debt ratio and a declining private external debt ratio, total external debt ratios in the 1990s were on average below those in the 1980s and exhibited a larger official component, which contrast with the conventional view that international financial institutions have been increasingly dwarfed by growing cross-border capital flows to emerging economies -a proposition that may be qualified when we add FDI and private borrowing, but not when look at sovereign finance. Indeed, even when include the growing domestic debt stocks we still find that the official lending share have been stable at about 14 percent of the total stock of total public debt since the late 1990s, with multilateral lending representing close to 12% of total debt by end-2004. These shares are even larger in nonemerging economies, to which we turn next.
Countries with limited or no market access
Overall, debt ratios for non-emerging market countries with limited or no access to the international capital markets have been remarkably stable at 60-70 percent. In contrast with emerging markets, the group appears to exhibit a declining trend in debt ratios (driven by official and, to a lesser extent private lending) that went from 80 percent at the beginning of the 1990s to 60 percent in 1995 and remaining stable thereafter (Figure 9 and Table 3 ). Note that this trend is significantly deeper for the simple average debt ratio due to one small country (highly indebted Nicaragua, which benefited from a large reduction in official debt in the context of the HIPIC initiative), as reflected in the difference between the simple average (represented by the dark bars) and the median and the weighted average ratios (the dark area and the light bars, respectively) in the early period.
Very much like the EM group, falling debt over GDP in the first half of the nineties was mostly due to real growth and appreciating currencies. Unlike the EM -however -in this On the other hand, external debt due to private creditors hovered at around 8 percent of GDP, and multilateral debt ranged between 16 and 20 percent. As noted, for this group the participation of multilateral lending in sovereign finance has been historically larger than for emerging economies, accounting for close to one third of the total since the early 90s. Figure 12 shows the composition of debt by currency for the emerging countries for which we have complete data for the last ten years. Although the (weighted average) of foreign currency debt increased from 24 percent of GDP in 1996 to 29 percent in 2004, its share in total debt dropped from 52 to 44 percent due to the growing share of domestic debt, typically denominated in the local currency. Interestingly, whereas foreign currency debt represent close to 100 percent of external obligations for the group, it is marginal in most domestic markets (the average peaked at only 9 percent in 2001). This provides a stark illustration of the link between location (in turn, related with the residence of the lender) and currency denomination that have been highlighted in the literature (see footnote 4). In this particular case, this was reflected, primarily, in a decline in the dollar share of total debt that was the result of lower external dollar debt ratios that were more than compensated by an increase in local currency denominated domestic debt, both indexed to the local CPI (which more than doubled over the 1996-2004 period to reach 6 percent of GDP) and nominal (which went from 20 percent of GDP in 1996 to 30 percent of GDP in 2004). In addition, recent years witnessed some international issues in domestic currency which, at less than 1 percent of GDP, suggest that the lack of local currency external debt, rather than inability to borrow, reflected the unwillingness to pay a higher currency premium than in domestic markets.
Currency Composition
Note, however, that onshoring of public debt is not in all cases a panacea for reducing overall dollarization, as domestic dollarization of public debt remains significant in Argentina and
Uruguay, and to a lesser extent in Peru and Colombia (Table 4) .
Another aspect of financial vulnerability that has received considerable attention in the literature is the maturity of debt, particularly in relation with local currency debt subject to nominal risk. We report data on the maturity of domestic debt in the last column of Table 4 . The conventional view is that de-dollarization in the region may have come at the expense of increased reliance on short term debt, as dollarization and short-termism are both ways of coping with aggregate price risk (De La Torre and Schmuckler, 2005) . To explore this view, Figure 13 combines the share of short term debt and foreign currency domestic debt, and plots the path of this overall "risk exposure" over time for the small sample of countries in which both variables are available. Interestingly, with the exception of Brazil, the conventional wisdom view is not validated in the data.
In sum debt composition display two important trends that have only deepened in recent years: on the one hand, debt onshoring (that is, the gradual substitution of domestic for external debt) and dedollarization (possibly as the results of the general preference for the home currency exhibited by financial markets).
Netting
Countries with similar debt ratios but different stocks of liquid public assets are not strictly comparable from the perspective of debt sustainability. The distinction pertains not only to the holdings of international reserves, but also to the treatment of cross-holdings of public paper by separate public entities, and between national and sub-national governments. Hence, the relevance of a clear definition of net debt for cross-country comparisons.
There are at least three important items that could be netted out of the gross debt stocks reported above, which in turn correspond to public entities that may or may not be consolidated within the public sector for the purposes of public debt accounting.
The first one is the group of SOEs, which includes state-owned banks as a particular case.
As noted, we chose to exclude SOEs as a second best course of action in the absence of a good valuation of the SOE's non-financial assets. 14 Notice that this may not entail a problem for the case of a public bank, where non-financial items represent a minor part of the balance sheet.
However, rather than netting out public bank holdings of government debt, consolidating the financial public sector would imply -much in the same way as we do with the central bankadding the net liability position of public banks vis à vis the private sector. While we believe this goes beyond the traditional concept of sovereign debt, the exercises can be readily done based on the (often publicly available) balance sheet data of public banks.
The second big item concerning net debt is the cross holding of government debt by the Central Bank, is somewhat less controversial. A first correction is readily motivated by the inclusion of long-run central bank obligations within the public debt figure: central bank holdings of government paper should be netted out of the total. Central Bank holdings of government debt can, in principle, be broken down into "marketable" debt -government paper held permanently or transitorily by the Central Bank-and "non marketable debt" -instruments in the domestic credit account issued by the government as the counterpart of the monetary base. In consolidating the central bank with the non-financial public sector, it seems appropriate only to net the marketable debt excluding both domestic credit instruments and the monetary liabilities of the Central Bank, as they are unlikely to be redeemed. As noted earlier, we also leave out short-term central bank obligations issued for the purpose of monetary regulation. We keep track of this revised debt variable denoting it as net debt 1. In addition, we net out international reserves (again, in line with most official statistics) to obtain our preferred definition of net debt (net debt 2).
15
The following simplified central bank balance sheet illustrates in a simple way these two definitions:
Assets Liabilities NET DEBT 2 = Gross debt - (2) - (3) The third and most controversial item relates to social security reform, and recognizes the fact that the transition from a public pay-as-you-go pension (PYG) system to a private fully funded private capitalization (FFP) system had an important effect on both the level of public debt and the amount of future liabilities facing the government. Because the reduction in implicit liabilities comes hand in hand with the issuing of new debt instruments to finance the transition phase of the reform, focusing on only one aspect provides a distorted view of the debt burden 15 Note that an increase in money demand that leads to reserve accumulation shows up as a reduction in net debt 2. This is correct to the extent that the demand shock is persistent and monetization leads to an increase in the net asset position of the government. across countries. 16 On the other hand, the actual value of implicit liabilities is virtually impossible to assess because since the government preserves the option to alter them by introducing legal changes (such as reducing benefits or tighter eligibility conditions or bailing out certain groups increasing their benefits). Bearing this caveat in mind, the fact that countries that privatized their social security saw their debt ratios increase as a result cannot be ignored, particularly in Latin America where the pension reform trend of the 90s was most prominent.
An example helps illustrate the point. When Chile privatized its social security system it gave workers the option to remain in the old PYG system, or move to the new system. Those moving where granted the so-called "Bonos de Reconocimiento" to document their past contributions to the old system. For this group of workers the reform should be neutral for the level of public debt: the "Bonos de Reconocimiento" are simply making an implicit liability explicit. However, gross debt measures show a sizable increase, due the issuance of the "Bonos de Reconocimiento" at the time of the reform. It follows that subtracting these bonds is a sensible way to correct for what would otherwise be an overstatement of the debt position of the government.
Unfortunately, in most cases the reduction in the flow costs of the pay-as-you-go system brought about by privatization (alternatively, the annual growth in implicit social security obligations under the old system) are far more difficult to evaluate. One crude way to tackle this problem is to assume that the stock accumulated in pension funds equals the reduction in implicit social security liabilities due to the reform. We follow this approach for our third definition of net debt, net debt 3 = net debt 2 -Pension Fund assets. This, in essence, extends the Chilean example to the more complex cases where the correspondence between pension fund savings and government reduced obligations is not so clear. Thus, if the government financed the revenue shortfall during the transition to the new pension system by placing new debt with pension funds, the reform would not be reflected in net debt figures. Alternatively, if the shortfall were financed via a higher fiscal effort (e.g., a tax hike), there would be a decline in net debt, as the government pre-pays a fraction of their future liabilities. This said, the solution proposed here is based on very strong assumptions. First, this method is implicitly assuming that private contribution rates were set in such a way that replacement rates in the FFP are the same as in the old PYG system. In addition, this assumption implies that if return on pension funds exceeds projected returns then this procedure would overstate the reduction in liabilities (and hence understate net debt). Second, as noted, implicit pension obligations are easier to dilute and less exposed to currency risk (as they are implicitly indexed to real wages). stocks of accumulated assets that vary between 18% (Bolivia) and 6% (Mexico). As can be seen, there are two countries for which this measure of net debt actually takes a negative value:
Trinidad and Tobago, which is characterized by low debt and large international reserves, and Chile, with low debt and large pension fund savings. More generally, the difference between gross and net debt is important in most countries in the sample.
Dollarization of Public Debt in The Americas
As discussed in the introduction, currency mismatches have drawn increasing attention in recent years -in particular after the financial crises in Mexico 95, Asia 1997 and Argentina 2001.
Despite substantial theoretical work on this issue -and abundant evidence on dollarization in the private sector -the level and determinants of dollarization in the public sector has remained relatively unexplored due to lack of data. Furthermore, the last column of Table 4 shows, overall vulnerability of public debt to real exchange rate shocks (as measured by total foreign currency public debt over GDP) remains high in several countries in the region, in particular in Argentina, Nicaragua and Uruguay. With this in mind this section reports a series of stylized facts that shed light on the determinants of public debt dollarization in the Americas.
There is a strong link between location and currency. Whereas by end-2004 virtually all external debt was foreign currency denominated, a vast majority of domestic debt is issued in the local currency, of which the largest part is in nominal pesos. Note that this applies to all countries irrespective of their levels of development (including developed Canada and, to the extent that all sovereign debt is domestically denominated, also to the U.S.). Hence a first dimension to consider is the domestic and external shares of debt (Figure 16 ). In seven countries domestic debt accounts for more than half of total gross debt, the highest domestic share corresponding to Chile (close to 80 percent). At the other end of the distribution, less than 20% of total debt is domestic in Belize, Paraguay and Honduras.
Note that this difference is not driven by differential access to international markets (which the latter countries do not have) but rather by the degree of development of domestic ones.
Indeed, all US public debt is domestically issued, and the domestic share of Canada is comparable with the Chilean one and clearly above the region's average. Table 6 . As the table shows, these results are also robust to restricting our sample to Latin American and Caribbean countries.
There is a positive and significant association between overall development and domestic to total debt ratios. A likely explanation is that per capita GDP is correlated with rule of law and institutional development, limiting the advantage of issuing offshore where debt falls under foreign jurisdiction. The size of the domestic financial market -also positively correlated with per capita GDP is also a possible explanation for this finding. Governments find it easier to finance their deficit domestically if there are well developed markets for debt and large banking sectors.
Interestingly, there is also a positive association between the overall size of the economy and the share of domestic public debt (Figure 18 ), pointing at the incidence of fixed cost in the functioning of financial markets, and to the relevance of liquidity -which requires both a large investor base and a large stock of instruments. Pension reforms entail a move in that direction. In addition to pushing up the stock of public debt during the transition phase, they create a "captive market" for public debt. In most cases, offshore investment by pension funds is severely restricted, while domestic investment is usually limited to a set of low risk assets. With this in mind, the last column of Table 6 includes the share of pension fund assets over GDP as additional determinant of the domestic share of public debt. As shown in the table -and despite our small sample size -we find a significant positive effect of pension assets on the share of domestic public debt.
The second key dimension for overall dollarization is the share of domestic debt in foreign currency. As reported above, despite the fact that domestic debt is always less dollarized than foreign debt, there are countries in the region where dollarization of domestic debt is significant. There is a sizeable recent literature that has explored the determinants of dollarization in the domestic banking system. 18 Broadly speaking, this literature argues that a substantial share of dollarization can be seen as a privately rational response of borrowers and depositors to the relative risks of local currency and dollar denominated debt contracts. In those countries in which local currency debt is risky (because of expectations of high and volatile inflation), agents prefer the dollar denominated alternatives.
A simple way of seeing whether these mechanisms carry through to public debt is to compare bank dollarization with the degree of dollarization in domestic public debt in 2001. As Figure 19 shows, the correlation is indeed high. Indeed, a simple OLS regression of the dollarization of public debt on bank dollarization for 2001 gives an R2 of 0.5, and a coefficient of 0.65 (significant at 1%). Moreover, R2 rises to 0.6 when Brazil and Colombia -countries which severely restrict banking dollarization are excluded. One possible interpretation of these results is that the same macroeconomic factors driving dollarization of private contracts are also driving dollarization of public debt in the region. It remains to be seen, therefore, if the forced dedollarization that has taken place in Argentina after default (and that has pushed the share of domestic dollar debt down from close to 80% in 2001 to the current levels) is sustainable in time.
Conclusions
The main findings revealed by the new debt dataset introduced in this paper can be summarized as follows:
• Debt ratios in the developing America are comparable with ratios in developed countries and remained at the same 60 percent levels that they had at the beginning of the 1990s. Moreover, they have remained remarkably stable since 1999.
• These regional averages hide large cross country differences in both the level and trends of public debt. On the one extreme, countries such as Chile, Panama and Nicaragua have seen their debt decline steadily in the period covered by the database. At the other extreme, countries like Belize, Colombia and Jamaica have seen their public debt rise throughout most of the period.
• Where debt ratios have fallen, this has largely been the result of positive growth and appreciating currencies -rather than a reduction of the stock of outstanding debt. This was particularly true in the early 1990s.
• Macroeconomic crises have played an important role in the evolution of the ratio of public to GDP in the Americas -either through changes in the dollar value of the debt (as in the debt haircuts of Argentina and Ecuador or the fiscal costs of the bank bailout in and through the valuation effects of large depreciations.
• In contrast to the stable average stocks of debt, the composition of these debt stocks (by lender, currency and location) have changed visibly over the last 15 years.
• By lender: private lending shifted from bank-to bond-based (private lending), while official lending moved from bilateral to multilateral. On the other hand, in contrast with the conventional view that booming international markets have dwarfed the economic importance of multilateral financial institutions, the latter continue to be an economically important source of finance across the region.
• By place of issuance: the incidence of domestically issued debt has increased remarkably over the last decade, accounting for most of the growth in debt ratios.
• By currency: the region has exhibited a strong dedollarization trend in recent years, largely as a result of the growing reliance on domestic markets. Indeed, the evidence presented here also confirms the link between currency and location previously highlighted in the literature: domestically issued debt has been primarily (and increasingly) denominated in the local currency, while external debt has been almost entirely issued in a foreign currency.
• A common concern has been that dedollarization in the region has come at the expense of a higher share of short term debt. Although data on maturity is relatively limited, this paper shows that this concern is generally not valid -dedollarization has often not come at the expense of lower maturities. issued domestically is positively related to per-capita-income (a broad measure of economic and institutional development), to the economic size of the country (associated economies of scale and, specifically, market liquidity), and to the presence of institutional investors (proxied by the stock of private pension funds assets).
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